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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
COURTS--COURTS OF LIMITED OR INFERIOR JURISDICTION-WHETHER
STATUTORY AMENDMENT INCREASING JURISDICTION OP MUNICIPAL COURT
OF CHICAGO OVER FOURTH CLASS PERSONAL INJURY SUITS is VALID-A de-

'cision of particular interest to Chicago attorneys should be found in the
holding in the case of Secco v. Chicago Transit Authority.1 The plaintiff
therein filed suit in the Municipal Court of Chicago alleging that, by reason of the defendant's negligence, she had sustained personal injuries
and was entitled to damages in the sum of $5,000. Defendant's motion to
dismiss, based on the contention that the court in question lacked jurisdiction to hear personal injury cases when the amount involved exceeded
$1,000, was sustained. Plaintiff thereafter took an appeal and the Appellate Court for the First District, after it had interpreted the controlling
statute, reversed and remanded the case with direction to the trial court
to proceed with the matter.
As originally constituted, the Municipal Court of Chicago was given
jurisdiction to entertain civil suits, with some exceptions, which fell into
one of two categories, i. e., those of the first class, excluding personal injury claims, where the amount involved exceeded $1,000, and those of the
fourth class, which included personal injury suits under the generic description of "civil actions . . . for the recovery of money only,' '2 where
the amount claimed, exclusive of costs, did not exceed $1,000. Pursuant
thereto, a sharp distinction existed with reference to claims based on contracts, either express or implied, and a definite limitation was imposed
over tort jurisdiction, particularly in the personal injury field. By the
1951 amendment, insofar as the same pertains to the recovery of money,
the legislature increased the fourth class limit to $5,000 but left the basic
minimum for first class cases at $1,000. As a consequence, the defendant
propounded the theory that the amendment was invalid for ambiguity and
uncertainty.8
12 Ill. App. (2d) 239, 119 N. E. (2d) 471 (1954). The cause was originally
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court but was transferred for lack of a constitutional issue.
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357. The statute, as amended by Laws
1951, p. 1726, defines the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Chicago, with respect
to fourth class cases, to include actions "for the recovery of money only" when the
amount claimed does not exceed $5,000, but places a ceiling as to other types of
fourth class actions at $1,000: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357.
8 If a statute is vague or uncertain, and cannot be made clear by proper interpretation, it will be held invalid: People v. Hurley, 402 Ill. 562, 85 N. E. (2d) 26
(1949) ; Barnett v. County of Cook, 388 Ill. 251, 57 N. E. (2d) 873 (1944) ; Krebs
v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. (2d) 786 (1944) ; Wagner v. Retirement Board,
370 Ill. 73, 17 N. E. (2d) 197 (1938).

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

Actually, of course, the uncertainty, if one existed, related solely
to suits based on contracts for the provision with regard to fourth class
personal injury suits is without any conflicting counterpart in the section describing the first class cases. The court could have disposed of the
case before it by so noting,4 but it did interpret the amendment so as to
permit the Municipal Court of Chicago, under the classification of fourth
class actions, to entertain non-contract cases not otherwise specifically described in amounts up to $5,000 while still preserving the old distinctions
as to contract suits. This enlargement in jurisdiction will probably operate
to relieve some of the pressure which has been placed on the County Court
of Cook County 5 as well as work to solve some of the interminable delay
between suit and trial,6 but it is clear that problems of the character presented by the instant case could be obviated by a thorough-going revision
of the judicial article of the state constitution.
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DICE AFTER TRIAL BEGINS OTHER THAN ON COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE REGu-

NONSUiT-A practice question of importance was involved in the
recent case of Wilhite v. Agbayani' wherein the counter-plaintiff and
counter-defendant had originally been co-defendants along with others.
Each had filed cross-claims against the other as well as against

LATING

the plaintiff and other co-defendants. 2 Subsequently, on stipulation, all
causes of action with the exception of counter-plaintiff's claims were ordered dismissed. During a pretrial conference, the counter-defendant
raised a question as to the competency of certain evidence which was to
be offered by the counter-plaintiff, whereupon the latter, claiming surprise from the dismissal of the other causes of action, requested a continuance.3 This request was denied upon the understanding that the parties
4 Issues with respect to the validity of the referendum at which the amended
statute received popular approval were involved, but have not been here considered.
The court, in that regard, held the referendum provision to be directory rather than
mandatory.
5 That court has been hearing tort cases, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1,
Ch. 37, § 177, provided the amount involved does not exceed $2,000. The net result
of the amendment has been to place the Municipal Court of Chicago in a position
superior to that of a state court.
6 The court took judicial notice of the large backlog of cases awaiting trial in the
state courts located in Cook County.
I Sub nom. Almazan v. Wilhite and Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Agbayani, 2 II.
App. (2d) 29, 118 N. E. (2d) 440 (1954). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162, permits the use of a counterclaim for
this purpose.
3 To avoid an adverse ruling on the oral motion for a continuance, the defendant
should have complied with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.14(1). See
also In re Adams Estate, 348 Ill. App. 124, 108 N. E. (2d) 32 (1952).
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would then select a jury but postpone the pretrial conference and the
hearing until the next day, all of which was done. The following day,
the evidence question was reargued and the objection to counter-plaintiff's
proof was sustained. Because of this adverse ruling, the counter-plaintiff
summarily moved to dismiss his counterclaim without prejudice, 4 which
motion, over objection and request for a directed verdict in favor of
counter-defendant, was granted. The counter-defendant appealed from
the order dismissing the counterclaim without prejudice and the Appellate
Court for the Third District then reversed and remanded with a direction
to enter judgment in bar on the ground the trial had begun and the counter-plaintiff was not entitled to a nonsuit except upon full compliance with
the provisions of Section 52 of the Civil Practice Act. 5
Inasmuch as there are no prior Illinois cases possessing analogous facts
construing the statute in question and the query presented appears to be
the first of its kind to be passed upon by a reviewing tribunal in Illinois,
the question raised in the instant case generates a problem as to whether
or not the court correctly ascertained the legislative intention. Without
regard to the state of the law prior to the adoption of the present statute,6
the law now seems to be well established with regard to the procedural
methods which a plaintiff must follow in order to obtain a voluntary dismissal, 7 particularly after a defendant has filed a counterclaim or a trial
has begun. The novelty in the instant case lies in the fact that the statute
in question has now been declared to be equally applicable to a defendant
who has presented a counterclaim. Technically, the statute makes no
reference to that situation, but the court, in reaching its conclusion, gave
a liberal interpretation to the provision in order to make it apply alike
to both parties. When it is remembered that, for other procedural purposes, a counterclaim is to be dealt with as if it were a suit by defendant,
4 An unsupported written motion, reciting that it was presented before trial was
begun, was presented by the counter-plaintiff.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176.
6 Daube v. Kuppenheimer, 272 Ill. 350, 112 N. E. 61 (1916), illustrates the view,
under Sections 48 and 70 of the Practice Act of 1907, that a plaintiff could take a
voluntary nonsult as a matter right at any time prior to judgment.
7 The statute has been interpreted and applied, as to plaintiffs, in the related
cases of Gilbert v. Langbein, 343 Ill. App. 132, 98 N. E. (2d) 140 (1951) ; Glick v.
Glick, 338 Ill. App. 637, 88 N. E. (2d) 509 (1949) ; Bernick v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 325 Ill. App. 495, 60 N. E. (2d) 442 (1945) ; Gunderson v. First National Bank,
296 Ill. App. 111, 16 N. E: (2d) 306 (1938).
8 It is not easy to tell when the trial does begin. It has been said that a civil
trial commences when a jury has been sworn to try the issues: Gilbert v. Langbein,
343 Ill. App. 132, 98 N. E. (2d) 140 (1951). In the absence of a jury, it would
probably not commence until the court had entered upon an examination of the
facts, as by the swearing of at least one witness and the propounding of at least one
question. This, at least, is the rule with regard to criminal cases: 22 C. J. S.,
Criminal Law, § 241.
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acting as a plaintiff, against others9 there would seem to be every reason
why the methods established should be made equally applicable to both
plaintiff and defendant.
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SUMMONS NAMING EXECUTOR-DEFENDANT AS AN INDIVIDUAL OPERATES TO
CONFER JURISDICTION OVER Him IN His REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY-A liberal interpretation given to certain concepts underlying the Illinois Civil
Practice Act would appear to form the basis for the holding in the recent
case of Wessel v. Eilenberger.1 The action was one to procure the specific
performance of an oral contract allegedly made by the decedent under
which he agreed to devise certain property, at his death, to the plaintiff.
The complaint was directed against the heirs at law of the decedent, in
their individual right, and also described certain of these same parties as
occupying varied representative capacities. Notwithstanding this, the summons appears to have been issued only in the names of the several defendants as individuals. Certain of these defendants, answering the complaint
as individuals only, set up the fact that while they had been named in the
suit as representative parties they had not been so described in the summons
nor had they been served in such representative capacities. As individuals,
however, they contested the suit on the merits and lost in the trial court.
On direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, because a freehold was
involved,2 that court affirmed the decree when it held that the purpose
of process was accomplished when the parties had been served, particularly
since they had, from an inspection of the complaint, been fully advised as
to the capacity, or capacities, in which they had been sued. The error, if
any, with respect to the form of the process was there regarded as being
cured by the subsequent steps taken in the case.
Discrepancies existing between the summons and the declaration, or
other initial pleading, in a case have generally been regarded as forming
one or the other of two possible types of defect depending on the point as
to whether the error related to the plaintiff or to the defendant. If, for
example, under the common law practice, an original writ had been issued
in the name of a single plaintiff but the claim, as disclosed in the declaration later placed on file, was stated to be jointly owned by two or more
plaintiffs, the defect was regarded as being one of substance sufficient to
9 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162(3), which directs
that a counterclaim should be pleaded with the same particularity as Is required
of a complaint, and Ch. 110, § 172(2), permitting the use of a defensive motion to
dismiss against a counterclaim as well as against a complaint.
12 Ill. (2d) 522, 119 N. E. (2d) 207 (1954).
2 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
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require the granting of a motion in arrest of judgment.3 In much the same
way, on a writ issued in behalf of a plaintiff suing as an individual, it was
considered to be a fatal error to count on a claim belonging to the plaintiff
not as an individual but as executor under a will.4 In these instances, at a
time when the writ preceded the pleading, the allegations of the writ were
considered to be controlling for it formed the jurisdictional base for the
power to hear and determine. On the other hand, as in a suit in equity,
where the bill of complaint was designed to precede the summons, any
error with regard to naming,' describing, or serving the defendant was
considered, at best, to be a ground for abatement only, hence could be
waived by pleading over to the merits. 6
The present Illinois Civil Practice Act apparently contemplates that
the filing of the complaint should be the initial step in the action, 7 hence it
would now appear to be the controlling jurisdictional factor. A summons
directed in favor of, or against, a party not named in the complaint would
probably be fatally defective8 but, in the light of the instant case, defects
in the summons, when tested by the allegations of the complaint itself,
would appear to be of less fatal character. It would certainly appear to be
desirable, especially where representative parties are involved, to have
process read, and be served, in conformity with the complaint, so no possible jurisdictional questions could arise.9 Nevertheless, the instant holding
would purport to illustrate the proposition that one on whom summons has
been served is charged, by that fact, with notice that jurisdiction has been
3 Rogers v. Jenkins, 1 Bos. & P. 383, 126 Eng. Rep. 966 (1799).

Hally v. Tipping, 3 Wils. K. B. 61, 95 Eng. Rep. 933 (1770).
53 L. R. A. 562 (1901).
6 Black v. Thompson, 120 Ill. App. 424 (1905). The issue therein appears to have
been similar to the one in the instant case but the action arose under a former
practice act.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 129. After stating that every civil action,
with certain exceptions, "shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint," the
statute goes on to state that the clerk "shall Issue summons upon request of the
plaintiff." The chronological order of these steps would appear to be significant.
8 But see Vokovich v. Custer, 415 Ill. 290, 112 N. E. (2d) 712 (1953), wherein the
plaintiff died prior to the institution of suit for personal injuries but, on amended
complaint, his legal representative was permitted to have summons issued In the
name of the latter although the action had been commenced in the name of the
dead person.
9 Persons suing, or being sued, in an official or representative capacity are, in
contemplation of law, distinct persons and strangers with respect to any right or
liability as individuals: Leonard v. Pierce, 182 N. Y. 431, 75 N. E. 313 (1905).
When so sued, the term "as" should appear between the name and the described
capacity In order to emphasize the fact that the suit is not intended to bind the
individual as such: Kinsella v. Cahn, 185 Ill. 208, 56 N. E. 1119 (1900). Naturally,
of course, the allegations of the complaint would control and a substantial description therein will be sufficient: Cooney v. Sweitzer, 205 Ill. App. 597 (1917).
4

5 Stuyvesant v. Well, 167 N. Y. 421, 60 N. E. 738,
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obtained over him both in the description contained in the summons and
also in .whatever other capacity he may be declared to possess in the complaint itself.10 If that is the law, a distinct change has been made in former
practice requirements.
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MENT-WHETHER BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE PROTECTS DEBTOR FROM GARNISHMENT WHEN PRIOR

JUDGMENT RESTS

ON CLAIM

FOR MONEY

MISAP-

PROPRIATED-A unique issue with respect to garnishment was presented to

the Appellate Court for the First District through the medium of the case
of Airo Supply Company v. Page.' The judgment debtor there concerned
had served as plaintiff's sole bookkeeper, had misappropriated a large sum
of money, had pleaded guilty to a charge of embezzlement, and had served
a term in the penitentiary. While the debtor was so imprisoned, plaintiff
filed a civil action to recover the amount misappropriated and originally
obtained a default judgment which included a finding of malice2 but, by
agreement, this judgment was vacated and replaced by another, for the
same amount and based on the same facts, wherein the request for a body
execution was specifically denied. Following the debtor's release from the
penitentiary, the creditor began garnishment proceedings and succeeded in
reaching certain unpaid wages due the debtor. The debtor then moved ti
abate the proceedings, relying on a subsequent discharge in a bankruptcy
proceeding wherein the judgment in question had been scheduled with
other debts. The trial court sustained the motion but, on appeal by the
judgment creditor, this order was reversed when the Appellate Court
reached the conclusion that, despite the absence of a finding of malice, the
defendant was not the "honest debtor" entitled to secure relief but rather
was to be treated as one who had obtained funds by defalcation while acting
in a fiduciary capacity so not entitled to be protected by the discharge in
bankruptcy.3
10 It is not clear why, despite participation in the merits of the case as individuals, the-several defendants in question were not granted the benefit of their
answers in abatement. The old rule, as Illustrated by the case of Pond v. Ennis,
69 Ill. 341 (1873), which stated that a defense in abatement would be waived by a
simultaneous pleading to the merits, has clearly been overruled by Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110 § 167(3). Compare this point with the holding in Procaccianti
v. Procaccianti, 76 R. I. 305, 69 A. (2d) 635 (1949), where the court held that a
summons issued to "Giuseppe Procaccianti, alias John Doe, Executor of the Estate
of Rudolph Procacclanti," said to be no more than de8criptio personae, did more
than confer jurisdiction over him as an individual, particularly since the defendant
had not attacked the writ by a timely special pleading but had relied solely on the
general issue.
12 Ill. App. (2d) 264, 119 N. E. (2d) 400 (1954).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 5.
3 11 U. S. C. A. § 35(4) provides for release except where the debt was created
by "fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer
or in any fiduciary capacity."
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Although an extremely restricted character has been given to the tort
judgment based on malice and the like by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Ingalls v. Raklios,4 a case in which the court
sharply limited the scope of the Illinois statute with respect to body execations,5 it does not follow that an inability to enforce a judgment by that
method necessarily proves that the claim of the plaintiff is one dischargeable in bankruptcy. While it is clear that the contrary finding would
establish without question, that the claim was not one subject to discharge,
the presence of the malice finding would appear to be pertinent only with
respect to body executions for, as the court there noted, a defendant can
be actuated by malice and the like without the same forming the gist of
plaintiff's action. 6
Having passed this hurdle, the court in the instant case was then concerned with the remaining question as to whether or not the defendant had
been guilty of a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity within the
intent of the bankruptcy statute.7 In the absence of Illinois decisions, the
court relied on cases cited by the plaintiff from other jurisdictions. In one
of them, that of Citizens Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Gardner,s the defendant was an insurance agent who had collected but failed to
remit premium proceeds to the company. In another, that of Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Company v. Herbst,9 a receiver in a foreclosure
suit had withdrawn money which had been placed in a suspense account
pending determination of an appeal. Even though the courts concerned
were willing to assume that the parties involved had acted in good faith,
the defaults were said to be defalcations within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, hence recovery was not barred by a discharge in bankruptcy. 10
It would appear, then, that anyone occupying a position necessitating an
accounting of funds in his control will have to practice extreme honesty,
even though malice, fraud, or embezzlement be lacking, for the protection
of bankruptcy will not be available to change his status from a debtor to a
debt-free individual.
4 373 Ill. 404, 26 N. E. (2d) 468 (1940). It was there held to be essential that the
judgment should contain an express finding of malice to warrant issuance of a body
execution.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 5.
6 373 Ill. 404 at 408, 26 N. E. (2d) 468 at 470.
7 In 8 C. J. S., Bankruptcy, § 578c, p. 1541, the statement is made that "defalcation," as used in the provision of the act under discussion, is "of broader meaning
than embezzlement or misappropriation. An act need not be shown to be willful or
malicious to constitute a defalcation."
8 315 Mich. 689, 24 N. W. (2d) 410 (1946).
9 93 F. (2d) 510, 114 A. L. R. 769 (1937).
10 See also First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker, 225 N. C. 480, 35 S. H. (2d)
489 (1945), where a former guardian who had failed to account for the minor's
funds was denied protection under a discharge in bankruptcy.
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REQUIRING
OF APPEARANCE PRECLUDES POSSIBILITY OF JURY TRIAL WiHERE DEMAND COMES
ON REMAND AFTER ArPEAL-A striking change in the Illinois practice with
JURY-RIGHT

DEMAND

TO TRIAL BY

JURY-WHETHER

STATUTE

FOR JURY TRIAL AT COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT OR FILING

respect to trial by jury may be noted under the holding in the case of
Reese v. Laymon.1 In that case, a suit for personal injuries, the original
trial of the cause was conducted by the court alone as neither party had
demanded a jury trial. Following plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judgment, the reviewing court reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial.2
Upon reassignment for trial, the defendant then moved for a jury trial but
this motion was denied on the ground the request came too late, hence was
barred by Section 64 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.3 Following a second trial, with judgment there for the plaintiff, the defendant took a direct
appeal 4 to the Illinois Supreme Court, claiming the constitutional right to
a trial by jury5 was being infringed by the interpretation given to the statute in question. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the judgment when
it held the statute effective and adequate to make the failure to demand a
jury trial at the time of commencement of suit or filing of appearance
sufficient to forever preclude the parties from asserting such a demand at
any later stage of the case.
There can be no dispute over the fact that, at the time of the adoption
of the present Civil Practice Act, the legislature planned a drastic change
'with regard to the matter of procuring trial by jury for it there substituted,

in lieu of the prior concept that jury trial should always be had in proper
cases except where the same was expressly waived by the parties,6 the contrary concept that jury trial was thereafter to be had only provided the
same was expressly demanded.7 The necessity for the prompt making of

such a demand, at least with respect to the initial trial of the case, has been
reinforced by the theory that, absent a demand, an implied waiver of the
constitutional privilege could well be assumed to exist.' The statute is
silent, 9 however, with respect to the effect to be given to this presumed
waiver in case of a remand of the action for new trial following a successful
appeal. Under the earlier practice, on the belief that the express waiver
12 111. (2d) 614, 119 N. E. (2d) 271 (1954).

2 See Reese v. Laymon, 346 Ill. App. 465, 105 N. E. (2d) 526 (1952), abst. opinion.
3 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188(1).
4 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 199.
5 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 5.
6 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 110, § 60, and explanatory note in Ill. Civ. Prac.
Act Annotated, p. 152.
7 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188(1).
8 Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
9 It does expressly cover certain other possible eventualities, such as the transfer
of a cause from the equity side of the court to the law docket.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

had become exhausted by the first trial, it had been considered proper for
the parties, or either of them, to insist upon jury trial following remandment. 10 The instant decision now indicates that this practice will no longer
be permitted to prevail, particularly since, upon remandment, the case
stands on the existing record and not as it were an entirely new suit. It
can be said, therefore, that unless the litigant is careful to preserve his
constitutional right to jury trial from the outset he is likely to find that,
once the right is gone, it is gone forever.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-STATUTES 0F LIMITATIoN-WHETHER OR NOT
ADDITION OF LIMITATION CLAUSE TO ILLINOIS DRAm SHOP ACT OPERATES
TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH HAD ACCRUED PRIOR TO DATE OF SUCH

AMENDmENT-Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District,
in Orlicki v. McCarthy,1 was confronted with a question as to whether or
not a suit under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 2 based upon a cause of action,
which accrued before, but on which action was not started until after, a
recent amendment to that statute had been enacted,8 should be regarded as
being barred by the giving of retroactive effect to such statutory amendment. The complaint therein, based upon facts which had occurred prior
to the effective date of the amendment in question, had been filed within
what might be regarded as ample time but for such amendment. 4 Nevertheless, on motion by the defendant,5 the trial court dismissed the complaint
and the Appellate Court for the First District, on appeal to it, while aware
of a possible contrary holding in the Second District,' preferred to align
itself with the view taken of the problem in the Fourth District., In so
doing, and affirming the trial court holding, it too gave retroactive effect to
the statutory amendment.
10 Osgood v. Skinner, 186 Ill. 491, 57 N. E. 1041 (1900).
12 Ill. App. (2d) 182, 119 N. E. (2d) 1 (1954).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, VoL 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
8 Laws 1949, p. 816, added a proviso to the effect that every action for damage
caused by intoxication should be "commenced within two years next after the cause
of action accrued."
4 The cause of action appears to have arisen on July 10, 1949, and the suit was
filed on September 27, 1951. The suit would have been well within the five-year
period fixed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16, but fell beyond the two-year
period presently fixed by Ch. 43, § 135.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(f), authorizes the use of a motion to
dismiss whenever the cause of action does not accrue within the time limited by law
for the commencement of suit thereon.
6 The court referred to the case of Steiskel v. Straus, arising in the Second District, wherein rehearing has been granted. No opinion therein has, as yet, been
released for publication.
7 See Fourt v. DeLazzer, 348 Ill. App. 191, 108 N. E. (2d) 599 (1952), noted in
31 CHICAo-KENT LAW REVIEw 273.
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Up to this point, there has been a paucity of cases in Illinois wherein
courts have considered the applicability of limitation statutes to dram shop
matters. In one very early decision,' the court held that the two-year statute was inapplicable but, in a later case, 9 treating the action as one to recover a statutory penalty, the court indicated that it was necessary to commence the suit within two years after the cause of action had accrued. The
lack of a specific statute on the point has been cured by the adoption of
the amendment in question but the legislature failed to specify therein
whether the provision should be retroactive, as well as prospective, in operation. If prospective only, it might still be considered possible, supposing
the five-year period of limitation applied, to institute suit on old claims.
If, on the other hand, as the instant case would suggest, the amended statute is retroactive in character, all pending or future litigation would be
measured by the present statute.
Absent a definite expression to make a statute retroactive, Illinois
courts have generally decided that statutes should be considered to have
prospective operation only,10 unless the language thereof so clearly indicates an intention that it is to operate retroactively so as to admit of no
other construction.'1 This, however, is especially true of statutory enactments or amendments which would operate to destroy vested or substantive
rights, but is not necessarily so with respect to those which eliminate or
change remedies or procedures. 12 As to the latter, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company,"s once said there
is "no vested right in public law which is not in the nature of a private
grant. However beneficial an act of the legislature may be to a particular
person, or however injuriously its repeal may affect him, the legislature
would clearly have the right to abrogate it. "14 Once this fact is recognized,
and attention is given to the point that the Dram Shop Act is a statute of
highly penal character, 1 affording rights of action unknown to the common
law, there is every reason to believe that decisions of the type reflected in
the instant case should be upheld.
O'Leary v. Frisby, 17 Ill. App. 553 (1885).
9 Dabney v. Manion, 155 Ill. App. 238 (1910).
10 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 388 Il1. 316, 58 N. E. (2d) 182 (1944);
Friedman v. City of Chicago, 374 Ill. 545, 30 N. E. (2d) 36 (1940).
" People ex rel. Thompson v. Gage, 233 Il. 447, 84 N. E. 616 (1908).
12 Lubezny v. Ball, 322 Ill. App. 78, 53 N. E. (2d) 988 (1944); Lilly v. Grand
Trunk Western Ry. Co., 312 Ill. App. 73, 37 N. E. (2d) 888 (1941).
18290 Ill. 227, 125 N. E. 20 (1919).
14 290 Ill. 227 at 232, 125 N. E. 20 at 22.
15 Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73 (1889). But see the recent case of
Childers v. Modglin, 2 I1. App. (2d) 292, 119 N. E. (2d) 519 (1954), as to the
proper interpretation to be given to the damage provisions of the statute. The case
indicates that each person in whose favor a cause of action arises is entitled to an
independent recovery not to exceed $15,000, and that figure is not a limit on the
aggregate recovery by all persons affected.
8

CHICAGO-KENT

NEGLIGENCE -

ACTS

OR

LAW REVIEW

OMISSIONS

CONSTITUTING

NEGLIGENCE

-

WHETHER OR Nor A PILE OF LUMBER PLACED AT A CONSTRUCTION SITE
CONSTITUTES AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCF,-A decision of significance to builders and contractors may be noted in the holding in the recent case of Kahn
v. James Burton Company.' The action was brought on behalf of a minor
plaintiff to recover damages for personal injury sustained because of alleged
negligence on the part of the defendants. One of the defendants, a general
contractor, had ordered delivery of certain lumber to a private lot on
which it was engaged in erecting a home. The other defendant, a lumber
dealer, supplied the material and piled the same, without bracing, at the
construction site. The plaintiff, an eleven-year old boy, while riding his
bicycle in the vicinity, noticed the pile of lumber, imagined it represented
a ship, entered on the unguarded premises, climbed upon the lumber pile
and, while playing, was injured when the pile collapsed. After verdict in
favor of plaintiff, motions for directed verdict on behalf of both defendants
were overruled and judgment was entered for plaintiff. The Appellate
Court for the First District, however, on appeal to it, reversed the judgment
and remanded the case with direction to enter judgment for the defendants
when it concluded, as a matter of law, that the piling of lumber on private property for use in construction did not constitute an attractive nuisance nor amount to the creation of a dangerous instrumentality.
Plaintiff had advanced, as a theory to support recovery, that the
defendants maintained an attractive nuisance2 which drew the plaintiff, a
youth of tender years, onto the premises and exposed him to injury from
the dangerous condition. The court, following prior Illinois cases,3 pointed
out that the doctrine of attractive nuisance was one to be applied strictly
and did not require that every interesting or alluring object should be
considered to be an attractive nuisance. In line with earlier holdings, the
court listed certain prerequisites which would have to exist before the
doctrine could be applied, such as (1) the person against whom the doctrine
was asserted had to have possession or control over both the premises and
the instrumentality which caused the injury, (2) the object or instrumentality had to be dangerous in itself and likely to cause injury to those
coming in contact with it, (3) the object or instrumentality had to be
attractive and alluring to young children who were incapable, because of
youth, to comprehend the danger, (4) the object or instrumentality had to
be exposed and readily accessible, and (5) the person in control or pos1 1 I11. App. (2d) 370, 117 N. E. (2d) 670 (1954).
Leave to appeal has been
allowed.
2 See notes in 29 CICAGo-KENT LAw REvmw 172-6 and in 14 CHICAGo-KJENT REyiiw 76-9 for a general discussion of the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
3 Burns v. City of Chicago, 338 Il1. 89, 169 N. E. 81 (1930) ; Rogers v. Sins, 349
Ill. App. 353, 110 N. E. (2d) 643 (1953).
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session had to be able to foresee that children would come in contact with
the object or instrumentality.
The instant case becomes particularly important inasmuch as research discloses only one other Illinois case dealing with a somewhat
similar factual situation. In True & Company v. Woda,4 the injured child
had played on a pile of lumber which had been placed on a public sidewalk in violation of a city ordinance. The piling of the lumber in that
place was held to be an attractive nuisance, particularly since children
had a right to be on the public street or sidewalk, 5 hence their presence
should have been anticipated and proper precautions should have been
taken. Independently of this distinction, most other jurisdictions where
the issue has arisen have held that a pile of lumber does not per se constitute an attractive nuisance, whether the pile consists of poles,6 lumber
planks,7 railroad cross-ties, 8 boards, 9 or bridge ties, 10 on the theory such
piles of material are not alluring or tempting objects. The instant case
reaches a similar decision but the reasoning is different in that the court
treated the piling of lumber as other than an attractive nuisance because
it was not considered, under the facts, to be a dangerous instrumentality.
A different result might have been achieved had it been shown that children
were known to congregate about the building site, for then the pile, without bracing, would have represented a foreseeably dangerous condition.

WITNESSES--COMPETENCY-WHETHER
BY ILLEGAL SEARCH is

OR

NoT WITNESS DiscovERED

COMPEENT TO TEsTIrFY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-

According to the facts in the recent case of People v. Albea,' certain police
officers, without a warrant, went to the apartment of the defendant under
a belief that narcotic drugs were there being possessed and dispensed and,
on gaining admission, found both the defendant and a drug addict present,
apparently engaged in transacting an illegal sale. Following the defendant's
indictment on charges of unlawful sale and dispensation of narcotics, 2
defendant seasonably moved to suppress certain physical evidence seized on
the premises and also sought to exclude all testimony from the other person
4 201 Ill. 315, 66 N. E. 369 (1903).
5 See also Holmberg v. City of Chicago, 244 Ill. App. 505 (1927), with respect to
liability for piling sand and other excavated material In a public street.
6 Holland v. Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 296 Mich. 668, 296 N. W. 833 (1941).
T Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 577, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 903 (1909).
8 Carr v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., 123 Ore. 259, 261 P. 899, 60 A. L. R.
1434 (1927) ; Anderson v. Peters, 22 Tenn. App. 563, 124 S. W. (2d) 717 (1939).
9 Branan v. Wimsatt, 298 F. 833 (1924).
10 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 65, 36 S. W. 430, 32 L. R. A. 825

(1896).
12 Ill. (2d) 317, 118 N. E. (2d) 277 (1954).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.2.
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found present. This petition was sustained but, at the ensuing bench trial,
the person present was permitted to testify as to events which had occurred
prior to the arrival of the police. On the strength of such testimony, the
defendant was sentenced to a term in the penitentiary. Following issuance
of a writ of error to reverse such conviction,8 the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that the fortuitous discovery of the existence of a human witness by
means of an illegal search was to be deemed no different than would have
been the case of an illegal search and seizure of documents, records, or
other property,4 hence it reversed the conviction without remanding and
ordered the entire testimony of the witness suppressed.
While the Illinois view with respect to the suppression of evidence
obtained as the result of an illegal search may be the minority one, 5 Illinois courts, following the attitude expressed in Weeks v. United States,6
have consistently adhered to the theory that such evidence must be excluded
at the instance of the defendant, provided suitable action to that end has
been promptly taken,7 to avoid a violation of constitutional rights against
illegal search and seizure. If the evidence has been obtained in conjunction
with a subsequent search made after a lawful arrest,8 or with the defendant's permission, 9 no valid reason would exist for the exclusion thereof.
When, however, as in the instant case, the search precedes the arrest, provided no search warrant has been issued, 10 the evidence so gathered becomes tainted with illegality attendant upon its acquisition and should
be excluded. Heretofore, the rule has generally been invoked where the
evidence obtained was of inanimate character, such as contraband firearms1 1
or stolen goods, 12 but the rule has been applied to the seizure of records
from which the prosecution has learned of the existence of human witnesses
to the crime charged so as to require the exclusion of the testimony of such
witnesses.' s The instant case now logically extends the doctrine to include
8 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 780J.
4 In general, see U. S. Const., Amend. V, and Ii. Const. 1870, Art. II, J 6.
5 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 2183-4. The majority view is illustrated in People
v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
6232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
7 Compare People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112 (1924), with People v.
Bocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N. E. 728 (1923).
8 People v. Tillman, 1 Ill. (2d) 525, 116 N. E. (2d) 344 (1954).
9 But see People v. Schmoll, 383 I1. 280, 48 N. E. (2d) 933 (1943), to the effect
that the taking of records other than those referred to in the defendant's consent
would amount to an illegal search.
10 The procedure for obtaining a search warrant is described in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 691, et seq.
11 People v. Scaramuzzo, 352 11. 248, 185 N. E. 578 (1933).
12 People v. Dalpe, 371 Il. 607, 21 N. E. (2d) 756 (1939) ; People v. Poncher, 358
Ill. 73, 192 N. E. 732 (1934).
Is People v. Martin, 382 11. 192, 46 N. E. (2d) 997 (1948).
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the actual discovery of the human witness himself. To hold otherwise than
was done in that case would encourage, rather than deter, illegal searches
by law enforcement officers.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT Or ACT ON OTHER STATUTORY OR
COMMON LAw RIGHTS OF ACTION AND DEFENSES--WHDTIHER ILLINOIS STAT-

UTE ABOLISHES PossIBILiTY OF COMMON LAW ACTION BY COVERED EMPLOYEE

AGAINST Co-EMPLOYEE--According to the facts in the recent case of Hayes
v. Marshall Field & Company, 1 a department store employee became bothered with a particle of dust in her eye so she went to the company doctor,
made an individual defendant to the suit, and he, in the course of probing
for the particle, punctured the eyeball and caused the loss of sight therein.
The employee then sued both her employer and the doctor in a common law
action, charging them with having negligently caused the blindness. The
corporate and the individual defendants each moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground the action was barred by the provisions of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 The trial court, on the basis of the pleadings, held that the employee had sustained a compensable injury in the
course of her employment and was, for that reason, barred from suit
against the employer.3 The claim against the doctor was also stricken, but
this was done on the basis that he was a fellow employee of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the decision
on substantially the same grounds, the court remarking that the statute
"treats both employer and employee upon common grounds insofar as any
liability exists to answer for damages in an action by a fellow employee."'4
Accepting, for the purpose of this discussion, that the holding as to
the employer was correctly achieved, 5 there is still reason to doubt whether
the holding that the doctor was similarly protected by the statute represents
sound law. Leaving aside all question as to whether or not the company
doctor was a fellow servant,6 there seems to be little or no basis for the
1351 Ill. App. 329, 115 N. E. (2d) 99 (1953).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
s See the case of General Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 411 Ill. 401, 104
N. E. (2d) 257 (1952), on the point of whether or not a compensable injury
occurred.

4 351 Ill. App. 329 at 336, 115 N. E. (2d) 99 at 102.
5The decision in the case appears to have become final from the fact that the
plaintiff-appellant died while the appeal was pending and no personal representative appears to have been appointed to prosecute the matter. It is doubtful whether,
after affidavits to this effect had been filed, the Appellate Court was empowered to
decide the case. See Fortune v. Gilbert, 210 Ill. 354, 71 N. E. 442 (1904), as to
the effect to be given to the death of a co-appellant, and Wedig v. Kroger Grocery
& Baking Co., 278 Ill. App. 378 (1935), as to the effect to be given to the death of
the appellee. In the last-mentioned case, however, the legal representative was permitted to substitute and continue with the appeal.
6 See Thompson v. Northern Hotel Co., 256 Ill. 77, 99 N. E. 878 (1912).
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view that the statute relied upon supports the conclusion reached. It purportedly forbids resort to common law or statutory rights to recover damages for injury or death sustained by the covered employee while engaged
in the line of duty as such employee, other than a right to the compensation there provided, 7 but this prohibition is far from a total one and judicial
language would indicate that these provisions apply "only to the right of
the employee against his employer, and have no reference to the liability of
third persons causing injury to the employee. " 8
Whether or not an injured employee may sue a co-employee, where
the common employer is bound by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, has seldom been made the subject of inquiry in Illinois. In
two cases where the question arose, 9 a finding that the complaining employee had been injured in the course of his employment resulted in the
application of the first paragraph of then Section 29, which abolished the
cause of action against one also bound by the provisions of the act,'0 leading to dismissal of the suits. Shortly thereafter, in Botthof v. Fenske," the
court reviewed these holdings and decided that the result achieved was
erroneous for the reason that a fellow employee was not one "bound by the
Act" inasmuch as he was not one liable to pay compensation, hence the
then prohibition of Section 29 did not apply. With this elimination of the
statute, it was then possible for the court to state that a plaintiff employee
would retain "unaltered and unaffected by any provision of the Compensation Act his common-law right to sue his co-employee for his injuries.1"12
If any doubt may have been cast by dicta in any later case, 13 the decision in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Company,14 which held unconstitutional the attempted restraint upon suit by the injured employee against a
third person bound by the act, should have operated to resolve that doubt.
Without the restrictive clause of Section 29, there is nothing to support the
ruling in the instant case, hence the opinion therein represents a direct
conflict with the conclusion achieved in the Botthof case.

7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5.
8 O'Brien v. Chicago City Railway Co., 305 Il. 244 at 249, 137 N. E. 214 at 217
(1922).
9 Bentley v. LApper, 277 Il1. App. 615 (1934); Cunningham v. Netzger, 258 Ill.
App. 150 (1930).
1o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch.48, § 166.
11 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935).
12 280 Ill. App. 362 at 377.
13 See Thornton v. Herman, 380 Ill. 341, 43 N. E. (2d) 934 (1942), but note that
the action was not one between co-employees.
14412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvi w

375.

